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I. Introduction
Globalization has resulted in more international litigation,'
t Tony Abdollahi is a graduate of University of California Berkeley Boalt Hall School of
Law and practices commercial litigation with Watson Law Group.
I Tsai-Yi Yang v. Fu-Chiang Tsui, 499 F.3d 259, 280 (3d Cir. 2007)
("Globalization has lead to a dramatic increase in litigation of international ..
disputes."); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1157 n.12
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (recognizing "an unprecedented expansion of transnational activities
and a resulting increase in international business disputes"); Agfa-Gevaert, A.G. v. A.B.
Dick Co., 879 F.2d 1518, 1526 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting an "increase in international
commercial litigation").
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which in turn has led to an increasing number of international
discovery disputes.2 This phenomenon has been decades in the
making and, in the early 1970s, a group of nations established a
framework for conducting international discovery.' As a result of
their efforts, discovery from a foreign tribunal may proceed under
the Hague Convention ("the Convention").4
The years since its adoption have clarified the scope of the
Convention, and a number of principles have emerged. As
discussed in Part II of this article, discovery under the Convention
is based on a mutual respect as between the laws of the
participating nations-i.e., "comity." Accordingly, a discovery
request emanating from a foreign tribunal must be compatible with
the laws of both the propounding and host country.5 Moreover,
Part VI shows that a foreign tribunal is vested with the authority to
determine whether, and the extent to which, discovery from the
propounding nation is permissible under the former's own laws.'
As Part III explains, the Convention is an alternative
procedure, such that an American litigant's initial recourse is
normally under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("F.R.C.P."
or "Federal Rules"). The party seeking to invoke the Convention
has the burden of demonstrating that the Convention is superior-
e.g., more effective or offers greater protection-to the Federal
Rules.' As discussed in Part VIII, to the extent that an American
court has in personam jurisdiction, the foreign witness may be
examined in the host country pursuant to a noticed deposition
2 See, e.g., Lantheus Medical Imaging, Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 841 F.
Supp. 2d 769, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (acknowledging that "[plaintiff] may well be correct
that transnational discovery requests are increasing due to the global nature of
international commerce. . . ").
3 See Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Authority, 272 F.R.D. 253, 255 (D.D.C.
2011) ("On March 18, 1970, seventeen nations .. . entered into the Hague Convention.").
4 See Bodner v. Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370, 372 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("The Hague
Convention is the popular name for the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature, Mar. 18, 1970 ... 23 U.S.T. 2555,
T.I.A.S. No. 7444 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §1781).").
5 As used in this article, "host country" or "host nation" refers to the nation from
which discovery is sought.
. 6 See Tulip Computers Int'l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 469,
472 (D. Del. 2003); In re Baycol Prod. Litig., 348 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1058 (D. Minn.
2004).
7 See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522,
544 (1987).
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under F.R.C.P. Rule 28(b).8 On the other hand, when a foreign
witness does not fall within the jurisdiction of an American court,
discovery usually proceeds under the Convention.'
Unlike the comparative predictability of the Federal Rules,
discovery under the Convention is often expensive and may yield
uncertain results. Part IV explains that a discovery request under
the Convention is subject to the multiple-part test established by
the Supreme Court in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale
v. U.S. District Court,'o wherein the propounding party must
demonstrate the importance of the evidence, the place of its
origination, disprove "alternative means" of obtaining the
information, and show that "noncompliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the United States."" But,
as described in Part V, even if a discovery request complies with
Aerospatiale, it is subject to the privileges, restrictions, and
relevancy limits of the host nation.
Accordingly, Part VII demonstrates that while the Convention
provides a channel for discovery in circumstances where it would
otherwise be unavailable-e.g., where an American court lacks
jurisdiction over a foreign witness-comity ensures that the host
nation from which discovery is sought obtains the protections of
its own laws and as well as the laws of the propounding nation.
II. The Hague Convention is Predicated on "Comity" and
Brings a Uniform Standard for Undertaking Discovery
Among Participating Nations.
The Hague Convention is the culmination of years of
negotiations between participating nations with the intent of
achieving a level of uniformity regarding international discovery.
The difficulty in reaching an agreement arose, in large part,
because different nations have different rules regarding discovery
(e.g., civil versus common law countries), such that one nation
may take issue with a request propounded from a foreign
8 See id. at 553 n.4.
9 See id. at 540-41.
10 Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. 522.
ii Id. at 544 n.28.
12 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42, 49 (D.D.C.
1984) ("The goal of the Hague Convention was to facilitate and increase the exchange of
information between nations.").
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jurisdiction that is inconsistent with the former's discovery rules."
The principle of comity-wherein each participating nation accords
respect to the discovery laws of the other-was key to
implementing the Convention. 14
Despite the challenge presented by attempting to reconcile
different systems of discovery, the increase in foreign trade-and
ensuing litigation-compelled a cooperative effort to establish a
framework for conducting foreign discovery:
The substantial increase in litigation with foreign aspects arising,
in part, from the unparalleled expansion of international trade
and travel in recent decades had intensified the need for an
effective international agreement to set up a model system to
bridge differences between the common law and civil law
approaches to the taking of evidence abroad. 5
Thus,
[t]he Hague Evidence Convention grew out of an effort over
several decades to promote cooperation in the development of
uniform rules of private international law ... the Convention
represented a "substantial breakthrough" that was to provide "a
bridge between civil law and common law practices for
international judicial assistance in the taking of evidence
abroad."' 6
From the perspective of an American litigant, the Convention
reflects that it is not always possible to bring a foreign witness
within the jurisdiction of an American court. 7
Against this backdrop, the Hague Convention, which became
13 See Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Am. Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 59 (E.D. Pa.
1983) ("The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters is a multilateral treaty that was designed to provide a uniform
procedure to be used in obtaining evidence in foreign countries. A central purpose of the
convention was to reconcile the markedly different discovery procedures that exist in
common law countries, such as the United States, and civil law countries, such as West
Germany.").
I4 See id.
15 Husa v. Labs. Servier SA, 740 A.2d 1092, 1096 (N.J. 1999).
16 S & S Screw Mach. Co. v. Cosa Corp., 647 F. Supp. 600, 612 (M.D. Tenn. 1986)
(internal citations omitted).
17 See DiFederico v. Marriott Int'l., Inc. 714 F.3d 796, 807 (4th Cir. 2013) ("In an
era of increasing international commerce, parties who choose to engage in international
transactions should know that when their foreign operations lead to litigation they cannot
expect always to bring their foreign opponents into a United States forum . . . .") (quoting
Mizokami Bros. v. Baychem Corp., 556 F.2d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 1977)).
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effective in 1972 and is codified under 28 U.S.C. § 1781, allows
discovery via a Letter of Request:
Article 1
In civil or commercial matters a judicial authority of a
Contracting State may, in accordance with the provisions of the
law of that State, request the competent authority of another
Contracting State, by means of a Letter of Request, to obtain
evidence, or to perform some other judicial act.18
Articles 11 and 21 provide that, inter alia, a foreign tribunal
may guard against discovery that is privileged, incompatible with,
or prohibited by the laws of the propounding or host nation:
Article 11
In the execution of a Letter of Request the person concerned
may refuse to give evidence in so far as he has a privilege or
duty to refuse to give the evidence-
(a) under the law of the State of execution; or
(b) under the law of the State of origin, and the privilege or duty
has been specified in the Letter, or, at the instance of the
requested authority, has been otherwise confirmed to that
authority by the requesting authority. 19
A Contracting State may declare that, in addition, it will respect
privileges and duties existing under the law of States other than
the State of origin and the State of execution, to the extent
specified in that declaration.20
Article 21
Where a diplomatic officer, consular agent or commissioner is
authorized under Articles 15, 16 or 17 to take evidence -
(a) he may take all kinds of evidence which are not incompatible
with the law of the State where the evidence is taken or contrary
to any permission granted pursuant to the above Articles, and
shall have power within such limits to administer an oath or take
an affirmation;
I The term "Letter of Request" is interchangeable with "Letter Rogatory." In re
Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 267 F.R.D. 361, 363 n.7 (D. Kan. 2010) ("In 1993, the
term 'letter of request' was substituted in the rule for the term 'letter rogatory' 'because
it is the primary method provided by the Hague Convention. A letter rogatory is
essentially a form of letter of request."').
19 Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1972).
20 Id. (emphasis added).
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(d) the evidence may be taken in the manner provided by the law
applicable to the court in which the action is pending provided
that such manner is not forbidden by the law of the State where
the evidence is taken;
(e) a person requested to give evidence may invoke the
privileges and duties to refuse to give the evidence contained in
Article 11.21
As reflected by Articles 11 and 21, discovery under the
Convention must respect the "integrity" of the participating
nations.22 Under the former, discovery pursuant to a Letter of
Request is subject to the privileges and duties of both the
propounding and the host nation. Under the latter, discovery must
be compatible with-and permitted under-the laws of the host
nation from which discovery is sought.2 3
Fifteen years after the Convention's adoption, the U.S.
Supreme Court, in its seminal decision Aerospatiale, declined to
adopt specific rules for discovery propounded under the
Convention and instead emphasized that-due to comity, expense,
and the potential for ulterior motives-American courts must
exercise caution in evaluating foreign discovery:
American courts, in supervising pretrial proceedings, should
exercise special vigilance to protect foreign litigants from the
danger that unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, discovery may
place them in a disadvantageous position. Judicial supervision
of discovery should always seek to minimize its costs and
inconvenience and to prevent improper uses of discovery
requests. When it is necessary to seek evidence abroad,
however, the district court must supervise pretrial proceedings
particularly closely to prevent discovery abuses. For example,
the additional cost of transportation of documents or witnesses
to or from foreign locations may increase the danger that
21 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, art. 21 [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention]
(emphasis added).
22 See Work v. Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45, 48 (D.D.C. 1985) ("[W]here [discovery) of
party witnesses are sought to be taken within the geographic boundaries of a State which
is a party to the Hague Evidence Convention, such discovery must be in accord with the
procedures required by that Convention, in order to protect the territorial sovereignty of
that Nation.").
23 Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 21, art. 21.
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discovery may be sought for the improper purpose of motivating
settlement, rather than finding relevant and probative
evidence. Objections to "abusive" discovery that foreign
litigants advance should therefore receive the most careful
consideration. In addition, we have long recognized the demands
of comity in suits involving foreign states, either as parties or as
sovereigns with a coordinate interest in the litigation. American
courts should therefore take care to demonstrate due respect for
any special problem confronted by the foreign litigant on
account of its nationality or the location of its operations, and for
any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state. We do not
articulate specific rules to guide this delicate task of
adjudication.24
While the Supreme Court declined to adopt "specific" rules,
the principle of "comity" remains a guiding force under the
Convention.
International comity is the recognition that one nation accords
within its territory to the otherwise nonbinding laws of another
nation, having due regard both for international cooperation and
for the rights of those who seek the protection of the domestic
laws. Comity is 'neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will upon the other.' 25
With respect to the United States' participation, one difficulty
in implementing the Convention was that American courts
typically vest litigants with broader discovery rights than their
foreign counterparts:
Great differences exist, however, between the American
approach that places discovery largely in the hands of the parties
with minimal court supervision before trial, and the traditional
civil law approach that regards gathering of evidence as an
exercise of judicial sovereignty entrusted largely to the court and
often delayed until the trial itself. These differences led
sometimes to impasses between U.S. courts and foreign
governments, and frequently to the result that evidence secured
abroad via unfamiliar procedures was either inadmissible or
otherwise useless in the requesting court. The Hague Evidence
Convention was designed to bridge these procedural obstacles
by providing a means ofsecuring evidence abroad that would be
24 Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
25 S & S Screw Mach. Co. v. Cosa Corp., 647 F. Supp. 600, 615 (M.D. Tenn. 1986)
(citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895)).
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"tolerable" in the executing state while at the same time
"utilizable" in the requesting forum.26
In this regard, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure try to
protect against asymmetric discovery by providing foreign entities
the same protections against improper discovery that are afforded
to American litigants.27
Thus, as a compromise between many nations, it may be said
that the Hague Convention exists because it is easier to conduct
discovery with it than without it. The increase in international
trade and ensuing litigation speak to this, as the Convention has
played a role in addressing disputes arising from distinct discovery
rules from different nations.28 Discovery under the Convention
therefore reflects-and attempts to assuage-the concerns that
preceded its adoption, viz. a request from the propounding
jurisdiction may not be compatible with the laws of the nation
from which evidence is sought.29 For this reason, discovery under
the Convention is guided by comity, such that its scope is
ultimately determined by the laws of the nation from which
discovery is sought, as interpreted by its own courts.30
III. The Hague Convention is an Alternative Procedure and
the Burden is on the Moving Party to Demonstrate that
The Federal Rules Are Inadequate.
The Hague Convention is an alternative method of discovery
vis-a-vis the F.R.C.P., such that discovery should initially proceed
under the F.R.C.P. unless they somehow prove inadequate. The
judicial "preference" for the F.R.C.P. is in part due to the fact that
discovery under the Convention, which often requires court
supervision, is slower and more costly.3 1 The party seeking to
26 Id. at 612 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
27 See Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Laboratories, 748 F. Supp. 2d 354, 359 (D.
Del. 2010) ("Rule 28(b), authorizing foreign discovery 'must be read together with Rule
26(c), which permits a court to make any order 'which justice requires to protect a party
or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.")
(internal quotations omitted).
28 See Philadelphia Gear, 100 F.R.D. at 59.
29 See Hague Evidence Convention, supra, note 21, art. 11.
30 See id. art. 21.
31 International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435,
450 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D.
360, 361 (D. Vt. 1984).
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invoke the Convention therefore bears the "burden of persuasion,"
and a court evaluating discovery under the Convention must give
equal consideration to the discovery procedures available under
the Federal Rules.32 Courts must weigh the applicability of the
Convention on a case-by-case basis and may decline to invoke the
Convention if discovery under the Federal Rules is adequate or if
discovery under the Convention is impractical."
As an initial matter, the Convention is inapplicable where an
American court has jurisdiction over the litigant-i.e., a party to
the action." Thus, the Convention does not displace an American
court's jurisdiction over a foreign litigant."
The Hague Convention is a permissive discovery procedure
whereby-subject to the rules and privileges of the participating
countries-a court in one signatory nation may request that
another signatory nation provide evidence in a manner
"customary" with the rules of the latter:
The Hague Evidence Convention serves as an alternative or
"permissive" route to the federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
the taking of evidence abroad from litigants and third parties
alike. The Convention allows judicial authorities in one
signatory country to obtain evidence located in another signatory
country "for use in judicial proceedings, commenced or
contemplated" . . . [u]pon receipt of a Letter of Request, which
must provide specific information regarding the lawsuit and the
information sought to be discovered, the signatory state "shall
[then] apply the appropriate measure of compulsion" as is
customary 'for the execution of orders issued by the authorities
32 See Pronova BioPharma Norge AS v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 708 F.
Supp. 2d 450, 452 (D. Del. 2010).
33 See In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation, 358 F.3d 288, 305
(3d Cir. 2004).
34 Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. U.S. Dist. Court for Western Dist. of
Oklahoma, 805 F.2d 340, 341 (10th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he Fifth Circuit held that '[t]he
Hague Convention has no application at all to the production of evidence in this country
by a party subject to the jurisdiction of a district court pursuant to the Federal Rules."');
Lowrance v. Michael Weinig, GmbH and Co., 107 F.R.D. 386, 388-89 (D.C. Tenn.
1985) ("[T]he Hague Convention does not apply to discovery efforts in this country
directed to a foreign national party over whom the court has in personam jurisdiction.").
35 Belmont Textile Machinery Co. v. Superba, S.A., 48 F. Supp. 2d 521, 524
(W.D.N.C. 1999) ("[T]he Hague Convention does not deprive a district court of
jurisdiction to order a foreign national party before it to produce evidence under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
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of its own country. " Individuals to whom a Letter of Request is
directed have the right to refuse to give evidence to the extent
they are protected by a privilege under either the law of the
State of execution or the State of origin.
Thus, as opposed to the "alternative" Hague Convention, the
applicable rules of discovery-e.g., the F.R.C.P.-are deemed
"normal":
The Hague Convention "prescribes certain procedures by which
a judicial authority in one contracting nation may request
evidence located in another nation." The Convention is not
mandatory and serves only as a permissive supplement to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When discovery is sought
from a foreign party, there is no rule of "first resort," compelling
the discovering party to attempt to utilize the Convention's
procedures before resorting to the Federal Rules. As such, the
Federal Rules remain the "normal method[] for federal
litigation involving foreign national parties" unless the facts of
a given case indicate "the 'optional' or 'supplemental'
Convention procedures prove to be conducive to discovery."
In acknowledging that the Convention is an alternative
procedure, Schindler relied on the holding in Aerospatiale that
"the text of the Evidence Convention, as well as the history of its
proposal and ratification by the United States, unambiguously
supports the conclusion that it was intended to establish optional
procedures that would facilitate the taking of evidence abroad."38
Observing that interrogatories and requests for production are
commonly used in international litigation, the Aerospatiale court
noted that designating the Convention as the exclusive procedure
would (unnecessarily) entail court supervision for "routine"
discovery:
An interpretation of the Hague Convention as the exclusive
means for obtaining evidence located abroad would effectively
subject every American court hearing a case involving a national
of a contracting state to the internal laws of that state.
Interrogatories and document requests are staples of
international commercial litigation, no less than of other suits,
36 Pronova BioPharma, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 452 (emphasis added).
37 Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 525, 528-29
(D.N.J. 2009) (emphasis added).
38 Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 538 (emphasis added).
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yet a rule of exclusivity would subordinate the court's
supervision of even the most routine of these pretrial
proceedings to the actions or, equally, to the inactions of foreign
judicial authorities.
The Supreme Court thus observed that the Convention is
merely one procedure for obtaining discovery from foreign
witnesses:
[I]t appears clear to us that the optional Convention procedures
are available whenever they will facilitate the gathering of
evidence by the means authorized in the Convention. Although
these procedures are not mandatory, the Hague Convention does
"'apply" to the production of evidence in a litigant's possession
in the sense that it is one method of seeking evidence that a court
may elect to employ.40
Citing an interest in speedy and inexpensive litigation, while
noting delay and expense as drawbacks, the Court rejected the
proposition that the Convention is the primary or default discovery
procedure regarding foreign witnesses:
[W]e cannot accept petitioners' invitation to announce a new
rule of law that would require first resort to Convention
procedures whenever discovery is sought from a foreign litigant.
Assuming, without deciding, that we have the lawmaking power
to do so, we are convinced that such a general rule would be
unwise. In many situations the Letter of Request procedure
authorized by the Convention would be unduly time consuming
and expensive, as well as less certain to produce needed
evidence than direct use of the Federal Rules. A rule of first
resort in all cases would therefore be inconsistent with the
overriding interest in the 'just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination" of litigation in our courts.41
For these reasons, before resorting to the Convention, a court
must examine the facts and the reasonableness of available
discovery procedures- e.g., the F.R.C.P. - on a case-by-case
basis:
We therefore decline to hold as a blanket matter that comity
requires resort to Hague Evidence Convention procedures
without prior scrutiny in each case of the particular facts,
39 Id. at 539 (emphasis added).
40 Id. at 541.
41 Id. at 542-43 (emphasis added).
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sovereign interests, and likelihood that resort to those procedures
will prove effective . .. [t]he exact line between reasonableness
and unreasonableness in each case must be drawn by the trial
court, based on its knowledge of the case and of the claims and
interests of the parties and the governments whose statutes and
policies they invoke.42
Adjunct to the case-by-case approach adopted by the Supreme
Court is the principle that the proponent of its use must
demonstrate that the Hague Convention is a superior to the Federal
Rules for obtaining discovery in a particular case. ' In this regard,
the intermediate federal courts, citing Aerospatiale, hold that the
burden of demonstrating the applicability of the Convention-
while not onerous-is on the party seeking discovery (or
protection) thereunder:
"A party which seeks the application of the Hague [Evidence]
Convention procedures rather than the Federal Rules [of Civil
Procedure] bears the burden of persuading the trial court[]' of
the necessity of proceeding pursuant to the Hague Evidence
Convention." "That burden is not great, however, since the
'Convention procedures are available whenever they will
facilitate the gathering of evidence by the means authorized in
the Convention."A
In this regard, the Aerospatiale factors considered in invoking
the Convention have been reduced to just three-(i) facts of a
particular case, (ii) sovereign interests, and (iii) potential
effectiveness:
In order to compel application of the Hague Convention over the
Federal Rules, the party seeking to apply the Convention
procedures bears the burden to show that the "particular facts,
sovereign interests, and likelihood [of resorting to Hague
procedures] will prove effective." In evaluating whether to
require resort to the Convention, courts should be mindful of
"unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, discovery" that may place
foreign litigants in a disadvantageous position.4
42 Id. at 544, 546 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).
43 Pronova BioPharma, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 452-53 (emphasis added); see also
Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 249 F.R.D. 429, 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) ("[A] party
seeking the application of the Hague Convention procedures, rather than the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, bears the burden of persuasion.").
44 Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 525, 528-29
(D.N.J. 2009); see also In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. Oct. 31, 1994, 172
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Thus, an American litigant should initially look to the Federal
Rules for international discovery and may resort to the Hague
Convention only if the litigant demonstrates that the latter is
superior based on the circumstances presented by a particular case.
The initial preference for the Federal Rules is due to a variety of
factors-cost, delay, the potential need for court supervision,
etc.-that the proponent of the Convention must allay before
discovery may proceed thereunder.4 5
Indeed, certain kinds of written discovery available under the
Federal Rules, such as interrogatories and requests for production,
may not be available in the foreign jurisdiction, thereby making
the F.R.C.P. preferable." Furthermore, while the Federal Rules
are a "known quantity" to American litigants, discovery under the
Convention is subject to the laws of the host country as interpreted
by its own courts.4 7 Accordingly, any issues that arise in the
course of discovery under the Convention may require an
American litigant to incur the costs of learning and effectuating the
laws of the foreign tribunal. The potential time and expense
associated with the foregoing may, in practice, make the Federal
Rules preferable to the Convention.
However, in the event that the Federal Rules will not allow the
desired discovery, and a litigant is willing to absorb the time and
cost, the Convention is available to obtain evidence from a foreign
jurisdiction.
F.R.D. 295, 309 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("Aerospatiale has been interpreted by lower courts to
contain a three-part test in determining whether 'to use the Hague Convention procedures
in favor of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In determining which methods of
discovery to use, courts should consider: (1) the intrusiveness of the discovery requests
given the facts of the particular case, (2) the Sovereign interests involved and, (3) the
likelihood that resort to the Convention would be an effective discovery device."'); see
also Valois of America, Inc. v. Risdon Corp., 183 F.R.D. 344, 346 (D. Conn. 1997)
(noting the "'three-pronged inquiry' set forth in Aerospatiale, namely (1) the
examination of the particular facts of the case, particularly with regard to the nature of
the discovery requested; (2) the sovereign interests in issue; and (3) the likelihood that
the Hague Convention procedures will prove effective.").
45 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522,
542-43 (1987).
46 Id. at 539; see also In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind., 172 F.R.D. at
310-11.
47 Tulip Computers, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 472; In re Baycol, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 1058;
see also Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 567.
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IV. Discovery Under The Hague Convention is Evaluated by
Factors Set Forth by The Supreme Court.
The "reasonableness" of a request determines whether, and the
extent to which, discovery is permitted under the Convention.4 8
However, the scope of discovery in the United States is often
broader than in foreign jurisdictions.4 9 In this regard, the Supreme
Court in Aerospatiale set out several factors to gauge whether
discovery may proceed under the Convention: (1) the importance
of the documents, (2) the specificity of the request, (3) whether the
information originated in the United States, (4) the availability of
alternate means of discovery, and (5) whether compliance with the
request undermines or enhances the interests of the United States
and the host nation, respectively.so Moreover, the Convention may
also be used as a shield against discovery, such that a party from
whom discovery is sought may attempt to avoid providing
responses pursuant to the laws of either the propounding or, more
saliently, the host nation.5'
Where the Hague Convention is invoked, a Letter of Request
must specifically set forth the information sought (or judicial act to
be performed) and the propounding party may be called upon to
provide information necessary to effectuate the discovery request:
Under the Hague Convention, a letter of request must specify
"the evidence to be obtained or other judicial act to be
performed," Art. 3, and must be in the language of the executing
authority or be accompanied by a translation into that language.
Art. 4, 23 U.S.T., at 2558-2559, T.I.A.S. 7444. Although the
discovery request must be specific, the party seeking discovery
may find it difficult or impossible to determine in advance what
evidence is within the control of the party urging resort to the
Convention and which parts of that evidence may qualify for
international judicial assistance under the Convention. This
information, however, is presumably within the control of the
producing party from which discovery is sought. The district
court may therefore require, in appropriate situations, that this
party bear the burden of providing translations and detailed
48 See Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546.
49 Id. at 542 ("It is well known that the scope of American discovery is often
significantly broader than is permitted in other jurisdictions.").
50 Id. at 544, n.28.
51 In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 355 (D. Conn. 1991).
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descriptions of relevant documents that are needed to assure
prompt and complete production pursuant to the terms of the
Convention.52
A court may consider the following factors in deciding
whether the Convention is applicable:
(1) the importance of the documents to the litigation; (2) the
degree of specificity of the request; (3) whether the information
originated in the United States; (4) the availability of alternate
means of securing the information; and (5) the extent to which
noncompliance with the request would undermine important
interests of the United States, or compliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the state where the
information is located. 3
On the heels of Aerospatiale, in In re Anschuetz & Co.,
GmbH,5 4 the Fifth Circuit confirmed that-in determining the
scope of discovery-an American court must consider the
reasonableness of the requests and the interests of the host nation:
[A]s the Supreme Court noted, [] sensitive interests of sovereign
powers are involved and [] it would be a serious mistake for the
district court not to respect properly such interests in the course
of deciding the appropriate discovery techniques to be applied.
In weighing the respective rights of the parties before it, and in
determining the need for granting discovery requests, the "exact
line between reasonableness and unreasonableness" is clearly a
matter for the trial court.55
The court observed that many countries do not subscribe to the
broad scope of discovery available in the United States, citing
Germany's restrictions on business information as an example:
[W]e emphasize that it is most important that the district court
should consider, with due caution, that many foreign countries,
particularly civil law countries, do not subscribe to our open-
ended views regarding pretrial discovery, and in some cases
may even be offended by our pretrial procedures. The purpose of
the Hague Convention is to strike a compromise among diferent
systems of laws in order to facilitate the administration of justice
52 Id. at 546 n.30.
53 In re Baycol Prod. Litig., 348 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1059 (D. Minn. 2004) (citing
Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28).
54 838 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988).
55 Id. at 1364 (emphasis added).
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without creating unnecessary friction among the foreign entities
involved. One example of such a consideration, offered for
illustrative purposes only, is the constitutional principle of
proportionality in the Federal Republic of Germany, "pursuant
to which a judge must protect personal privacy, commercial
property, and business secrets." 56
Thus, discovery that is not consonant with the Convention-
e.g., privileged in the propounding or host country, burdensome,
etc.-cannot be compelled from a foreign litigant.57
Moreover, an American court may decline to invoke the Hague
Convention where the moving party fails to demonstrate that it is a
superior procedure to the Federal Rules. In First American Corp.
v. Price Waterhouse LLP," the plaintiff filed suit after the collapse
of a bank and sought discovery from a United Kingdom
accounting partnership. The defendant objected on confidentiality
grounds and argued that "[the plaintiff] should be compelled to
resort first to the Hague Convention."" The court observed that
the Convention is not the exclusive means of obtaining
international discovery and that an American court's choice must
be guided by international comity:
The Hague Convention is not the exclusive means for obtaining
discovery from a foreign entity .... The Supreme Court in
Adrospatiale declined to announce any fixed rule on this subject,
at the same time suggesting that concerns of international comity
require that "American courts . .. take care to demonstrate due
respect for any special problem confronted by the foreign
litigant on account of its nationality or the location of its
operations, and for any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign
56 Id. (emphasis added); see also Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 249 F.R.D. 429,
441 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Because the scope of civil discovery in the United States is
broader than that of many foreign jurisdictions, some courts have applied a more
stringent test of relevancy when applying the Federal Rules to foreign discovery.").
57 In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 267 F.R.D. 361, 364 n.12 (D. Kan. 2010)
("Article II of the Hague Convention permits a person being questioned 'to refuse to
give evidence insofar as he has a privilege or a duty to refuse to give the evidence' under
the law of either the state of origin (i.e., the United States) of the state of execution (i.e.,
Germany).") (parenthesis in original); Valois, 183 F.R.D. at 349 ("If [the propounding
party] continues to insist upon burdensome and intrusive discovery from [the responding
party], then resort to the Hague Convention procedures ultimately may be appropriate.").
58 154 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1998).
59 Id. at 17.
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state.",60
The court noted that the defendant failed to show any conflict
between American law and United Kingdom law regarding
confidentiality protection:
[The defendant] does not show that there is a collision here
between the U.K. confidentiality laws and the federal discovery
procedures, or that the U.S. courts would be infringing the
prerogative of a British court to interpret the U.K. laws in the
first instance-two factors that we believe heavily influenced
courts that have restricted discovery in the way [the defendant]
61urges.
Citing several of the Aerospatiale factors, the Second Circuit
held that-rather than forcing the plaintiff to proceed under the
Convention-discovery was properly enforced by a subpoena
under the Federal Rules:
The district court here has done what comity requires in this
case. The court identified four factors deemed relevant ... for
gauging the reasonableness of foreign discovery: (i) the
competing interests of the nations whose laws are in conflict; (ii)
the hardship that compliance would impose on the party or
witness from whom discovery is sought; (iii) the importance to
the litigation of the information and documents requested; and
(iv) the good faith of the party resisting discovery. The district
court found that principles of comity weighed in favor of
enforcement of the subpoena.62
Notwithstanding the Aerospatiale factors, there are clear
instances-e.g., lack of jurisdiction over a foreign witness-where
the Hague Convention may be the only viable procedure.6' Thus,
where a federal court lacks jurisdiction over the witness,
proceeding under the Convention is "compulsory."6 4
60 Id. at 21 (quoting Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546).
61 Id. at 21.
62 Id. at 22 (citing Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Serys., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517,
523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
63 In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 267 F.R.D. 361, 364 n.12 (D. Kan. 2010)
("Resort to using the procedures of the Hague Convention is particularly appropriate
when, as here, a litigant seeks to depose a foreign non-party who is not subject to the
court's jurisdiction.").
64 Tulip Computers Int'l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 469, 474
(D. Del. 2003) ("When discovery is sought from a non-party in a foreign jurisdiction,
application of the Hague [Evidence] Convention, which encompasses principles of
international comity, is virtually compulsory") (citing Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546).
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Apart from the foregoing, the proponent of discovery under the
Convention bears the burden of persuasion to obtain discovery."
While not perfunctory, this burden is not prohibitive.6 6  The
propounding party may exercise a measure of control over certain
factors-tailoring specific discovery requests, demonstrating the
relevance of the documents sought to the litigation, and refuting
alternative means of obtaining the information. However, other
factors-such as whether the information originates outside the
United States and the extent to which compliance with the
discovery request affects the interests of the United States and the
host nation-appear to be largely out of a litigant's control.
The Convention may also be relied upon to resist discovery
pursuant to the same factors that allow it.67  Thus, even where its
invocation is mandatory-e.g., discovery is sought from a non-
party foreign witness-the foreign witness may properly refuse to
respond where the discovery is impermissible under the
Convention, such as where a request seeks information that is
privileged under the laws of the propounding or host country."
Indeed, there is a body of American jurisprudence dedicated to this
issue.
65 See In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 305 (3d
Cir. 2004). In denying a request to invoke the Hague Convention, the Third Circuit held
that the propounding party had not demonstrated that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were inadequate. "We agree first with the District Court's conclusion of law
that the appellants bear the burden of persuasion as to the optional use of the Convention
procedures . . . '[i]t is more practical, if not logical, to place the burden of persuasion on
the proponent of using the Hague Convention'." Id. (citing Rich v. KIS California, Inc.,
121 F.R.D. 254, 257-58 (M.D.N.C. 1988)).
66 The first step in evaluating whether to invoke the Hague Convention is to
determine whether or not the subject discovery may be conducted under the Federal
Rules. This means that an American litigant must first establish if the host country
authorizes a deposition before a person authorized to administer oaths in the place of
examination (FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b)(3)), or before a person commissioned by the court
(FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b)(4)). If so, it may be unnecessary to resort to the more time
consuming and expensive Hague procedures.
67 See generally Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 540 n.25 (finding rule of exclusivity
would enable a company which is a citizen of another contracting state to compete with a
domestic company on uneven terms); Soletanche & Rodio, Inc. v. Brown & Lambrecht
Earth Movers, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 269, 271 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (involuntary plaintiffs and
French nationals invoked the French blocking statute to resist a discovery order); see
also In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, 172 F.R.D. at 310; In re Perrier Bottled
Water, 138 F.R.D. at 353.
68 See Perrier, 138 F.R.D. at 355.
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V. The Hague Convention May Limit Intrusive, Burdensome,
Privileged, or Otherwise Objectionable Discovery.
The Hague Convention protects a foreign witness from
discovery that is intrusive, burdensome, or which seeks privileged
or irrelevant information.69 A foreign witness may therefore
invoke the Convention when presented with discovery that is
impermissible under the laws of either the propounding or host
nation. 0 Some American courts have gone so far as to hold that
such impermissible discovery impinges upon the "sovereignty" of
the host nation, as such discovery could otherwise compel the
production of information from a foreign witness that the host
nation itself could not require." In such circumstances, an
American litigant must either narrow the request or risk having it
disallowed.7 2
A key feature of the Convention-reflected by its emphasis on
the primacy of the "internal practices" of the host country"-is
that a witness from whom discovery is sought receives the breadth
of the protection of the laws of the propounding and host
countries:
This Court agrees with other authorities that a reading of the text
of article 27, particularly of the phrase "internal practice," and of
69 Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546.
70 Of course, if there is no conflict between the rules of an American court and the
host nation, both may be enforced. Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance Pour le
Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 35-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
("The need to respect the sovereignty of a foreign nation transcends the importance of
any particular case . . . [w]hen there is a direct conflict, the Court must-as it did in the
first part of the opinion-choose which law should govern. Absent a direct conflict,
however, it is the duty of this Court to enforce them both.") (emphasis added).
71 See, e.g., In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120, 125
(8th Cir. 1986) (finding that requiring discovery that a foreign court had refused under
Convention procedures would constitute "the greatest insult" to the sovereignty of that
tribunal); In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 613 (5th Cir. 1988)).
72 See Doster v. Schenk, 141 F.R.D. 50, 55 (M.D.N.C. 1991).
73 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters
art. 27, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.A. 231 ("The provisions of the present
Convention shall not prevent a Contracting State from - a) declaring that Letters of
Request may be transmitted to its judicial authorities through channels other than those
provided for in Article 2; b) permitting, by internal law or practice, any act provided for
in this Convention to be performed upon less restrictive conditions; c) permitting, by
internal law or practice, methods of taking evidence other than those provided for in this
Convention.").
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its context and legislative history, dictates the conclusion that its
aim is only to authorize more liberal practices that the requested
country chooses to utilize - not those a requesting country might
prefer.74
As a result, when presented with discovery deemed
objectionable, a foreign witness may compel an American litigant
to proceed under the Convention. In Seoul Semiconductor Co.
Ltd. v. Nichia Corp.,5 the plaintiff sued its competitors for patent
infringement, whereupon the latter issued a letter of request to a
foreign government to obtain discovery from its citizen. Citing
Aerospatiale, the court noted, "a court should exercise special
vigilance to protect foreign litigants from the danger that
unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, discovery may place them in
a disadvantageous position." 7
Applying the test from Aerospatiale, the court found that the
request for production was not sufficiently narrow, and this
weighed against allowing the discovery:
Defendants argue that the interests of France and the United
States would be best served by issuing Defendants' Letter of
Request. Defendants suggest that France's interests in
protecting its citizens and corporations from abusive, intrusive,
and unduly burdensome discovery are satisfied because the
document requests and deposition topics proposed by
Defendants are allegedly limited in scope and seek documents
and personal knowledge which are clearly identified and
referenced during discovery. As discussed above, the requests
are not so narrowly restricted ... [in the absence of a showing
of both good cause and a lack of alternatives, this factor weighs
against Defendants.
While the court agreed that an American court had an interest
in preventing patent infringement, it held that an American litigant
should obtain discovery through less intrusive means:
While the United States has an interest in ensuring that a
defendant may have access to critical documents for defendant's
defense, in this case, the Defendants may gain evidence through
74 S & S Screw Mach. Co. v. Cosa Corp., 647 F. Supp. 600, 615 (M.D. Tenn. 1986)
(emphasis added).
75 590 F. Supp. 2d 832 (E.D. Tex. 2008).
76 Id. at 834 (quoting Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546.)
77 Id. at 836 (emphasis added).
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other means that are less invasive to a French citizen, who was
evidently employed by, or on behalf of, the French
government.
Thus, even where relevant to the issues in the litigation,
intrusive discovery may be circumscribed. In Hudson v. Hermann
Pfauter GmbH & Co.,79 the plaintiff brought a product liability
action against a German manufacturer and propounded discovery
that, while relevant, delved into the defendant's business conduct:
[P]laintiffs served their first set of interrogatories on [the
defendant] pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. This set contains ninety-two interrogatories, many of
which contain sub-parts. While it appears that most of these
interrogatories seek relevant information, they cannot be
described as "unintrusive;" they seek detailed information
about ... the conduct of [defendant's] business affairs with
respect to the sale of such machines in the United States.o
The defendant objected to the discovery under the Hague
Convention, whereupon "plaintiffs indicated that they would not
voluntarily comply with [its] terms. . . ."" Citing Aerospatiale,
the court limited the discovery, holding that "application of the
analytical structure suggested by Justice Blackmun clearly favors
the use of Hague Convention procedures in the present case."8 2
Indeed, discovery upon a foreign witness that is overbroad or
seeks information not discoverable in the host country may
implicate the judicial sovereignty of the host nation. In In re
Perrier Bottled Water Litigation", the plaintiffs filed a product
liability and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) action against a French bottled water company, and
propounded interrogatories and a request for production. The
court noted, "it is obvious that plaintiffs' request seeks an
extraordinary volume of information, much of it irrelevant to the
cases at hand."" The court continued, "plaintiffs' discovery
requests are not narrowly tailored inquiries designed solely to
78 Id. at 836-37 (emphasis added).
79 117 F.R.D. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).
so Id. at 34.
81 Id. at 34-35.
82 Id. at 40.
83 In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348.
84 Id. at 354.
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target discreet and material information. Rather, although many of
the requests seek discoverable information, they call for extremely
broad responses from [the defendant], much of which is likely to
be immaterial, and intrusive."8s
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Hague
Convention was inapplicable, reasoning that discovery upon the
foreign litigant necessarily implicated the judicial sovereignty of
the host country:
Plaintiffs, however, have missed the point of the Hague
Evidence Convention. In this context, a foreign state's
sovereign interests are implicated, if at all, in seeking discovery
from citizens of the foreign state, within the boundaries of that
state, without the permission of that state ... [t]he act of taking
evidence in a common-law country from a willing witness,
without compulsion and without a breach of the peace, in aid of
a foreign proceeding, is a purely private matter, in which the
host country has no interest and in which its judicial authorities
have normally no wish to participate. To the contrary, the same
act in a civil-law country may be a public matter, and may
constitute the performance of a public judicial act by an
unauthorized foreign person. It may violate the 'judicial
sovereignty" of the host country, unless its authorities participate
86
or give their consent.
The court granted the "defendants' motion for a protective
order" and ordered "plaintiffs to employ the procedures set forth in
the Hague Evidence Convention. . . ."87
Accordingly, the Hague Convention is not just a vehicle for
obtaining discovery from foreign witnesses. Rather, a foreign
witness may invoke the Convention to curb discovery." This
affords a foreign witness the protection of the discovery laws of its
own country. Thus, evidence that is discoverable under the
F.R.C.P. may be protected under the Convention.
Again, this promotes comity by affording a foreign witness-
of any nation that is a party to the Convention-from whom
85 Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
86 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 557-58 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part)).
87 Id. at 356.
88 See id. (granting "defendants' motion for a protective order" by ordering
"plaintiffs to employ the procedures set forth in the Hague Evidence Convention in
pursuing any discovery").
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discovery is requested the protection of the applicable laws of not
just the propounding nation, but also the laws of the host country
with which the witness may be more familiar and which may be
more specifically tailored to the witness's interests." Ultimately,
the sovereignty of the host nation is reflected by its judiciary's
discretion to determine whether a foreign discovery request is
permissible within its jurisdiction.
VI. The Hague Convention Vests a Foreign Tribunal with the
Right to Interpret Its Own Laws.
A chief feature of the Hague Convention is to vest the tribunal
in the host nation with the right to determine whether a request
from a foreign-e.g. American-tribunal complies with the host
nation's laws.90 This promotes comity by allowing the host nation,
which is in a superior position to do so, to determine whether a
foreign discovery request complies with the former's rules
concerning discovery and evidence.
In Tulip Computers,9' the defendant sought discovery under
the Hague Convention from witnesses in the Netherlands,
whereupon the plaintiff sought to block the request. The court
observed that a foreign witness may refuse to produce evidence
contrary to the rules of its own-as well as the propounding-
nation. "The person to whom the discovery requests in a Letter of
Request are directed has the right to 'refuse to give evidence' to
the extent that the person has a privilege under the law of the State
of execution or the State of origin."92
The plaintiff argued that the discovery was a broad "fishing
expedition" request and objectionable under Article 23:9'
In particular, [plaintiff] argues that Article 23 of the Convention
prohibits the broad document inquiry sought by [defendant]
89 See id. at 352-56.
90 Tulip Computers Int'l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 469, 472
(D. Del. 2003) ("The signatory state, upon receipt and consideration, 'shall [then] apply
the appropriate measure of compulsion' as is customary 'for the execution of orders
issued by the authorities of its own country.').
91 Id.
92 Id. at 472.
93 Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 21, art. 23 ("A Contracting State may at
the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that it will not execute Letters of
Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in
Common Law countries.").
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because [defendant's] requests do not conform to the
Netherlands' reservations with regard to Article 23, which may
be characterized as prohibiting American-style discovery
"fishing expeditions." In addition, asserts [plaintiff], the Court
should deny [defendant's] requests because much of the
evidence [defendant] seeks is privileged information. Moreover,
maintains [plaintiff|, the evidence sought is either irrelevant to
the proceedings or constitutes inadmissible hearsay. 94
In allowing the discovery to proceed under the Convention, the
court noted that, if overbroad, a court in the host nation has the
power to limit the discovery. For example, "[i]f [defendant's]
document requests are overly broad under the law of the
Netherlands, as [plaintiff] maintains, then the requests will
presumably be narrowed by the appropriate judicial authorities in
the Netherlands before any documents are produced." 95
Similarly, the court in In re Baycol Products96 noted that the
terms of the Hague Convention ensure that a court in the host
nation reviews the propriety of a foreign discovery request. "The
Court agrees that whether the Letter Request will be executed in
light of Italy's Article 23 reservation, or whether the Letter
Request conflicts with Article 329 of the Italian Code of Criminal
Procedure, require interpretation of Italian law, which is best left
to the appropriate Italian tribunal."97
The principle of comity underlying the Hague Convention is
thus exemplified by the right of the host country to determine
whether a discovery request from a foreign tribunal complies with
the laws of the former. By virtue of its familiarity with its own
laws, a tribunal in the host country is in a superior position to
evaluate the propriety of a discovery request. This protection
often inures to the benefit of the foreign witness from whom
discovery is sought. On the other hand, for the propounding party,
this may increase the time and expense of undertaking discovery
94 Tulip Computers, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 473-74.
95 Id. at 475 (emphasis added).
96 In re Baycol Prod. Litig., 348 F. Supp. 2d 1058.
97 Id. at 1061 (emphasis added).
98 S & S Screw, 647 F. Supp. at 616 ("The Court concludes, therefore, that if there
is a reasonable likelihood that the Convention will produce the documentary
information ... to the extent that the fundamental principles of the German Law of
Procedure are not violated, such requests may be granted considering the justified
interests of the persons involved . . . .") (emphasis added).
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under the Hague Convention. For example, an American litigant
seeking discovery from a non-party foreign witness may have to
incur the expense of learning the laws and procedures of the host
country, and ensuring that its discovery requests comply therewith.
Accordingly, depending on the circumstances of a particular case,
a litigant must weigh the cost of discovery under the Convention
with the benefit of the evidence sought thereunder. These
considerations-e.g., cost-may result in choosing to conduct
discovery under the F.R.C.P. if it is an available option.
VII. Discovery Under The Federal Rules Vis-a-vis The Hague
Convention.
A litigant seeking-or resisting-international discovery must
decide whether to proceed under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Hague Convention, or both." While a number of
factors may be involved, the first-and occasionally dispositive-
issue is whether an American court has jurisdiction over the
foreign witness from whom discovery is sought.'0o If so, discovery
may proceed under either. If not-e.g., a foreign witness is a non-
party-discovery typically may only be compelled via the
Convention. While an important factor, jurisdiction is not always
the end of the analysis, as the cost of discovery under the
Convention is often a consideration.
As discussed above, an American litigant who seeks to invoke
the Convention has the burden to show that discovery under the
F.R.C.P. is not adequate."o' In this regard, Rule 28(b) provides for
the deposition of a witness in a foreign state as follows:
(1) In General. A deposition may be taken in a foreign country:
(A) under an applicable treaty or convention;
(B) under a letter of request, whether or not captioned a "letter
rogatory";
(C) on notice, before a person authorized to administer oaths
either by federal law or by the law in the place of examination;
or
99 See id. at 618 ("Both the Convention and the federal rules would be given effect
by an approach that requires litigants seeking foreign discovery to resort to Convention
procedures unless their use appeared futile from the outset.").
100 See Work v. Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45, 49 (D.D.C. 1985) ("[Tlhe Hague Evidence
Convention only applie[s] to evidence located within a foreign country.").
10 Pronova BioPharma, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 452-53; Strauss, 249 F.R.D. at 435.
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(D) before a person commissioned by the court to administer any
necessary oath and take testimony.102
Thus, by recognizing a letter of request as a means of
conducting discovery, Rule 28(b)(1)(B) acknowledges that
discovery may be taken under the Hague Convention subject to
compliance with the laws of the foreign jurisdiction:
The procedure provided by Rule 28(b)(1) is a reference to the
Hague Convention discussed in Aerospatiale. Pursuant to Rule
28(b)(2), "[1]etters of request, if honored by a foreign tribunal,
provide[] compulsory process abroad." However, "[s]ome
countries do not provide compulsory process to summon
witnesses, even to execute a letter of request." "Drafters of Rule
28 caution that complying with its terms does not ensure
completion of a foreign deposition . . . [i]t is well, however, to
realize that compliance with Rule 28(b), even as amended, will
not insure completion of a deposition abroad. Examination of the
law and policy of the particular foreign country involved, and
consultation with the Department of State, is advisable." 0 3
With respect to procedure, the Convention provides that each
member state is to establish a "Central Authority" responsible for
accepting and processing letters of request from other member
states.10 4 The Central Authority then transmits the request to the
appropriate judicial body for a response.' Specifically, a letter of
request may dictate discovery: (i) under the normal evidentiary
rules of the country where the witness is located; (ii) before a
diplomatic or consular officer of the country where the action is
pending; or (iii) by a commissioner specially appointed by the
102 See FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b); see also Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F.
Supp. 2d 1134, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2005) ("Rule 28(b) provides four ways in which a
United States court can obtain depositions in a foreign country: (1) pursuant to a treaty or
convention; (2) pursuant to a letter of request; (3) on notice before a person authorized to
administer oaths in the place where the examination is held; and (4) before a person
commissioned by the court.").
103 Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1151 (citations omitted).
104 See Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 640 (5th Cir.
1994) ("[T]he Hague Evidence Convention indicates that a contracting State must
designate a Central Authority for receipt of letters of request. Hague Evidence
Convention, art. 2."); see also Lowrance, 107 F.R.D. at 387 ("Under the Hague
Convention, a party seeking evidence abroad must obtain and send a Letter of Request to
the central authority of the country in which the evidence is sought, requesting service of
the request on the desired person or entity.").
105 See Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 510 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
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court in which the action is pending.' 6
Accordingly, while the F.R.C.P. may be considered the initial
option, discovery may proceed under the Hague Convention if the
F.R.C.P. is insufficient to obtain evidence abroad. The first step in
determining whether discovery is available under the F.R.C.P. is to
see if an American court has jurisdiction over a foreign witness;o
if so, the propounding party should, at least initially, consider
obtaining discovery under the F.R.C.P.'"
However, the fact that an American court may have
jurisdiction over a foreign witness does not necessarily dispense
with the Hague Convention.' 9 This may occur where a foreign
witness wishes to apply the potentially narrower discovery laws of
the host nation to curtail discovery otherwise available under the
F.R.C.P.
Apart from the issue of jurisdiction, other factors weigh into
the use of the Hague Convention on a case-by-case basis."'
Notwithstanding an American court's jurisdiction over a witness,
the cost and potential delay in conducting discovery under the
Convention may favor proceeding under the F.R.C.P."' Since the
standard methods (e.g., depositions, requests for production, etc.)
are available under the F.R.C.P., the costs of propounding
international discovery thereunder should be somewhat
comparable to domestic litigation and, in any event, less than the
106 See Pronova, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 452 n.3; Tulip Computers, 254 F. Supp. 2d at
472.
107 See Work 106 F.R.D. at 50-51 ("[H]armony can be achieved between the Hague
Evidence Convention and the applicable provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure where a federal court has in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
or individual.").
108 See Lechoslaw v. Bank of America, N.A., 618 F.3d 49, 57 (1st Cir. 2010) ("The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that depositions may be taken in a foreign
country pursuant to any applicable treaty or convention.").
109 See S & S Screw Mach. Co., 647 F. Supp. at 614 ("[A] party's duty to produce
evidence may be subject both to the Convention and to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The mere entry onto the scene of the Federal Rules, however, does not make
the Convention inapplicable to parties.").
1i1 Estate ofKlieman, 272 F.R.D. at 256 ("Whether courts resort to the Convention
procedures or the Federal Rules depends upon the facts of each case, 'sovereign interests,
and the likelihood that resort to those procedures will prove effective."').
III See Int'l Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 105 F.R.D. at 450 ("[A] number
of courts have observed that the Hague Convention ... is quite slow and costly even
when the foreign government agrees to cooperate.").
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costs associated with proceeding under the Convention.
Of course, the F.R.C.P. presumes jurisdiction over a foreign
witness." 2 While it remains an effective mechanism regarding
parties and party-affiliated witnesses, the F.R.C.P. is inapplicable
where an American court does not have jurisdiction over a
witness. A litigant's invocation of the Hague Convention is
therefore bolstered if a deposition is unavailable under Rule
28(b)(3) or (4), as this would tend to show that alternative methods
do not exist. In such instances, discovery may have to proceed
under the Convention. 13
VIII. A Foreign Litigant May Obtain Evidence From An
American Witness Under 28 U.S.C. §1782.
As an alternative to the Hague Convention, a foreign litigant
may pursue discovery from an American witness under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782. Section 1782 provides that a litigant in a "proceeding" in a
foreign jurisdiction may obtain discovery by petitioning the federal
district court wherein an American witness resides.' 14 Indeed,
since the right to discovery is often broader thereunder-i.e.,
discovery under section 1782 is not limited by whether the
information sought is either admissible or discoverable in the
foreign proceeding-foreign litigants increasingly rely on section
1782 vis-A-vis the Convention."'
Section 1782 allows a foreign litigant, through a letter of
request, to ask a United States district court to issue an
appointment to take testimony and obtain documents from an
American witness:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is
found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to
produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a
foreign or international tribunal, including criminal
investigations conducted before formal accusation. The order
112 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2013).
113 See S & S Screw Mach. Co., 647 F. Supp. at 614 ("[B]ecause United States
courts lack sovereign power to compel compliance by non-parties abroad, the
Convention perforce becomes the exclusive means to gather evidence from those
persons.").
114 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2013).
"15 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2013), with supra notes 99-113 and accompanying
text.
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may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request
made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the
application of any interested person and may direct that the
testimony or statement be given, or the document or other thing
be produced, before a person appointed by the court. By virtue
of his appointment, the person appointed has power to
administer any necessary oath and take the testimony or
statement. The order may prescribe the practice and procedure,
which may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the
foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking the
testimony or statement or producing the document or other
thing. To the extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise,
the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the document or
other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or
statement or to produce a document or other thing in violation of
any legally applicable privilege.'16
In its seminal decision, Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc., the United States Supreme Court noted, "[s]ection 1782 is the
product of congressional efforts, over the span of nearly 150 years,
to provide federal-court assistance in gathering evidence for use in
foreign tribunals."' 17
Section 1782 is meant to both facilitate fact-finding in
international litigation and offer the United States' judicial system
as an example for other countries to follow:
The goals of the statute, which dates back to 1855, are to provide
"equitable and efficacious" discovery procedures in United
States courts "for the benefit of tribunals and litigants involved
in litigation with international aspects," and to "encourage
foreign countries by example to provide similar means of
assistance to our courts." In pursuit of these twin goals, the
section has, over the years, been given "increasingly broad
applicability."' "
116 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2013).
117 Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247 (2004).
118 Lancaster Factoring Co. Ltd. v. Mangone, 90 F.3d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted); see also In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141, 160 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) ("[D]istrict courts must exercise their discretion under Section 1782 in light of the
twin aims of the statute: 'providing efficient means of assistance to participants in
international litigation in our federal courts and encouraging foreign countries by
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In this regard, a foreign litigant may proceed under section
1782, the Hague Convention, or both." 9 Indeed, a foreign litigant
is often deemed to have broader discovery rights under section
1782 than under the Convention.120  This is because discovery
under section 1782 is not limited by whether the requested
information is admissiblel21 or even discoverable 22 in the foreign
jurisdiction from which the request emanates. In other words, a
foreign litigant may be able to obtain information from an
American witness under section 1782 that would not be
discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction from which the request
propounded. A further reason to proceed under section 1782 is
that a United States district court does not normally inquire into
the foreign tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction.'23 Thus, section
1782 may yield discovery otherwise beyond the issues raised in
example to provide similar means of assistance to our courts."') (quoting Schmitz v.
Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP, 376 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2004)).
119 See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA. v. Kozeny, 115 F. Supp. 2d
1243, 1249 (D. Colo. 2000) ("Defendants may still seek documents and testimony from
U.S. witnesses under the Hague Convention or under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which provides
for production of documents and taking testimony in aid of foreign litigation."); see also
Proyectos Orchimex de Costa Rica, S.A. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 896 F. Supp.
1197, 1202-203 (M.D. Fla. 1995) ("[P]laintiffs would nevertheless be able to obtain
documents from third parties located in the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 as well
as through other extra-territorial means such as the Hague Convention.").
120 See In re Letter of Request From Boras Dist. Ct., 153 F.R.D. 31, 35 (E.D.N.Y.
1994) ("Petitioner's compliance with the terms of section 1782 and the Hague
Convention does not necessarily end this inquiry since this court must determine whether
it is appropriate to exercise the wide discretion conferred by section 1782.").
121 See In re Letters Rogatory from Tokyo Dist., Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d 1216, 1219
(9th Cir. 1976) ("Nor can the witnesses object to the district court's action on the ground
that the testimony to be taken may not be admissible in a [foreign] trial. Such evidence
may still be acceptable for preliminary stages in the [foreign nation's] procedure just as
American grand juries can consider evidence not admissible in a trial.").
122 See Brandi-Dohrn v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 673 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir.
2012) ("[A]s a district court should not consider the discoverability of the evidence in the
foreign proceeding, it should not consider the admissibility of evidence in the foreign
proceeding in ruling on a section 1782 application.") (emphasis added); see also
Application of Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[S]ection 1782 does not require
the district court to make a finding of discoverability under the laws of the foreign
jurisdiction.").
123 See In re Request For Judicial Assistance from Seoul Dist. Crim. Ct., Seoul, S.
Kor., 555 F.2d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 1977) ("In our judgment our federal courts, in
responding to requests, should not feel obliged to involve themselves in technical
questions of foreign law relating to subject-matter jurisdiction of foreign or international
tribunals.").
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the foreign proceeding.
In order to obtain discovery under section 1782, a litigant in a
proceeding abroad must make a good faith showing of a non-
intrusive need for the information, and that the request does not
circumvent discovery restrictions:
The Supreme Court has identified four discretionary factors to
guide the Court's determination whether to grant a Section 1782
application: (1) whether the material sought is within the foreign
tribunal's jurisdictional reach and thus accessible absent Section
1782 aid; (2) the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of
the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the
foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S.
federal-court jurisdictional assistance; (3) whether the Section
1782 request conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-
gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the
United States; and (4) whether the subpoena contains unduly
intrusive or burdensome requests.124
Notably, the diplomatic relationship between the United States
and the nation from which the discovery is propounded may affect
whether a district court allows the discovery:
The language of § 1782 itself does not provide specific guidance
to district courts in exercising such discretion. The
accompanying legislative history, however, does articulate
several factors that district courts may consider in deciding
whether to grant assistance under the statute: "[T]he court may
take into account the nature and attitudes of the government of
the country from which the request emanates and the character
of the proceedings in that country."l25
In this regard, a district court may decline a discovery request
from a foreign tribunal with characteristics inconsistent with
American principles of fairness:
A refusal to grant assistance under Section 1782 may also be
based on the district court's finding that, in some way, the
foreign proceedings are unfair or incompatible with domestic
124 In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d at 160; see also In re Godfrey, 526 F.
Supp. 2d 417, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
542 U.S. 241, 264-65 (2004)).
125 U.S. v. Sealed 1, Letter of Request for Legal Assistance from the Deputy
Prosecutor General of the Russ. Fed'n, 235 F.3d 1200, 1206 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting
S.Rep. No. 88-1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782,
3788).
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notions of propriety. But caution in that regard is warranted,
because American courts should not condemn foreign
proceedings merely because they are different from those
conducted in, or unknown to, American Courts.126
Nevertheless, in most instances, a litigant in a foreign
proceeding will find it easier to obtain discovery from an
American witness under section 1782 than an American litigant
from a foreign witness under the Hague Convention. Under
section 1782, a foreign litigant is not burdened by whether the
evidence sought is admissible or discoverable in the foreign
tribunal.127 Rather, the foreign litigant need only show that the
evidence cannot be obtained without section 1782, is from a
"receptive" foreign nation, does not circumvent discovery rules
(e.g., privileges), and is not intrusive. 2 8  While it may seem
inequitable to afford foreign litigants broader discovery in the
United States than American litigants have in foreign jurisdictions,
one of the goals underlying section 1782 is to promote greater
discovery rights abroad by using the example set in America.'2 9
IX. Conclusion
The theme of comity underlying the Hague Convention is
manifested by the discovery requests propounded thereunder.
From the perspective of an American litigant, the initial expression
of comity is that the Hague Convention is an alternative procedure
and the burden is on the proponent of discovery to demonstrate
that the F.R.C.P. is inadequate. Where an American tribunal has
jurisdiction over a foreign witness (e.g., the witness is a party or
party-affiliate), it may be unnecessary-and perhaps even unwise,
126 Id. (quoting Hans Smit, American Assitance to Litigation in Foreign and
International Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title 28 of the U.S.C. Revisited, 25 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 1 (1998)); see also In re Request For Judicial Assistance, 555 F.2d at
724 ("This is not to say that jurisdiction of the requesting court is never an appropriate
inquiry. If departures from our concepts of fundamental due process and fairness are
involved, a different question is presented - one that is not presented here and which we
do not reach.").
127 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2013).
128 See In re Chevron Corp., 749 F.Supp.2d at 160; see also In re Godfrey, 526 F.
Supp. 2d 417, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
542 U.S. 241, 264-65 (2004)).
129 See generally Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 247 (arguing that Congress repeatedly
broadened the scope of § 1782 in light of the increasing demands of international
commerce).
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given the attendant cost and delay-to proceed under the
Convention. Rather, where an American court has jurisdiction
over a foreign witness, that person may deposed under Rule 28(b).
However, where an American court does not have jurisdiction
over a witness (e.g., non-party foreigner), discovery may have to
proceed under the Hague Convention. In these circumstances, an
American litigant should ensure that the discovery complies with
the factors set forth in Aerospatiale by propounding specific
requests seeking evidence that is demonstrably important to the
litigation.
Another significant expression of comity under the Hague
Convention is where a foreign witness resists discovery under the
laws of its own nation. Accordingly, that discovery may be
permissible in the propounding jurisdiction-e.g., the United
States-does not preclude a foreign witness from relying on the
more restrictive laws of the host nation to decline discovery that is
impermissible there. In such circumstances, comity is further
effectuated by vesting a tribunal in the host nation with the right to
determine whether discovery propounded from a foreign nation
complies with the former's laws.
In short, depending on the situation, the Hague Convention
may be used as "sword" or a "shield." It is the former where an
American court does not have jurisdiction over a foreign witness
and discovery may only proceed under the Convention, and it is
the latter where a foreign witness relies on the discovery laws of
its own nation to limit a discovery response.
For these reasons, the Hague Convention is not a predictable-
much less perfect-channel for conducting discovery. Perhaps the
most prominent expression of comity under the Convention is that
it is not a one-size-fits-all means of discovery, but rather proceeds
on a case-by-case basis and often produces inefficient and less
than ideal results. These compromises reflect the principle that, in
crafting the Convention, the member nations sought to make
paramount the interests of the nation from whose residents
discovery is sought.
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